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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MASTER-SERVANT
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT - NOTICE TO SUB-AGENT
The plaintiff, Mrs. Shaffer, alleged in her petition that she tripped
on a loose, upturned brass strip on the edge of the top step and fell down
a stairway in a building owned by the defendant, S. S. Kresge Co. The
plaintiff attributed her fall to the negligence of the defendant in permit-
ting the defect to exist. A witness for the plaintiff testified that he had
informed a janitor or some other employee of the defect, and that it had
been existing for several years before the accident happened. The witness
was none too specific, and was directly contradicted by several witnesses
for the defendant, who testified that the brass strip was not raised and
that no complaints had been made. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, and after motion for a new trial was made by the defendant
and overruled by the court, judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The
court of appeals reversed the judgment as against the weight of the
evidence and remanded the case for a new trial. Shaffer v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 24 Ohio Abs. 9 (i937).
The occupier of course owes a duty of reasonable care to make
premises safe for an invitee. He is not an insurer. A defect in the steps
would not per se establish negligence. But if the defect had been existing
for some time, the defendant by the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered it. F. TV. Woolworth Co. v. Bland, 22 Ohio Abs. 66o
(i933); Stephens v. .1kron Palace Theatre Corp., 23 Ohio Abs.
(1936); 2 Cooley on Torts (3rd ed.), page 1259). Or if notice of a
dangerous condition had been given to the defendant, he would be negli-
gent in not repairing it. The plaintiff attempted to establish both the
defective condition and the notice, but the testimony of the principal
witness was none too satisfactory. This note is concerned only with the
agency problem.
Notice to an agent constitutes notice to his principal. Cincinnati,
etc. R. R. Co. v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N.E. 282, i6 L.R.A.
674 (1892). The imputation is a result of either of two theories.
2 /l1echem on Agency, (2d edition, 1914), sec. 18O5-i8o6. The one
is the "identity" theory, based upon so complete an identification of the
principal and agent that notice to an agent, within the scope of his
authority, is legally notice to the principal. This theory in effect makes
the agent the "alter ego" of the principal. Mock Mfg. Co. v. Win. D.
Smoot & Go., 102 Va. 724, 47 S.E. 859 (904); First Nat. Bank of
New Bremen v. Burns et al, 88 Ohio St. 434, 103 N.E. 931, 94
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L.R.A. (N.S.) 764 (1913). The other theory is based upon a conclu-
sive presumption that the agent will, according to his duty, make known
to his principal all the facts concerning his employment that are material
to his principal's interest, and the law presumes that the agent has per-
formed his duty, whether he in fact discloses such knowledge or not.
The Distilled Spirits, II Wall (U.S.) 356, P. 367, 20 L. Ed. 167
(1871); Henry v. Allen, 151 N.Y. 1, 45 N.E. 355, 36 L.R.A. 658
(1896); Modern Woodmen of America v. Colman, 68 Nebr. 66o,
94 N.W. 814 (1903); Booker v. Booker, 208 Ill. 529, 7o N.E. 709,
IOO A.L.R. 250 (1904); Interstate Nat. Bank v. Yates Center Nat.
Bank, 245 Fed. 294, 157 C.C.A. 486 (1917).
Under the presumption theory the agent must disclose all the knowl-
edge that he has regarding the subject matter, irrespective of the time at
which it was acquired, whether prior to or during the existence of the
agency. Under the "identity" theory, the rule is limited to knowledge
acquired during the actual existence of the agency. However, so far as
notice is concerned, the result is the same under either theory. 2 Me-
chem (2d Edition), sec. 1807.
In New Jersey the courts apply a somewhat different doctrine and
hold the principal liable for knowledge of the agent only when he would
have acquired it had he, the principal, acted in person. Lanning v.
Johnson, 75 N.J.L. 259, 69 Ad. 490 (19o8); Willard v. Denise,
5o N.J. Eq. 482, 26 Ad. 29, 35 Am. St. Rep. 788 (1892); Vulcan
Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 At. 339
(1907); Soy v. State, 41 N.J.L. 394 (1879).
Ohio has relied at time on the "identity" theory; Insurance Co. v.
Williams, 39 Ohio St. 584, 48 Am. Rep. 474 (1883); First Nat. Bank
of New Bremen v. Burns et al, 88 Ohio St. 434, 103 N.E. 931, 49
'L.R.A. (N.S.) 764 (913); Nat. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 27 Ohio C.A.
1o, 28 C.D. 253 (1915). At other times the Ohio courts have quoted
with approval a combination of the two theories. Foster v. Scottish Ins.
Co., iOi Ohio St. 18o, 127 N.E. 865 (1920); Myers v. John Han-
cock Mutual Life Ins. Co., etc., io8 Ohio St. 175, 14o N.E. 504
(1923); Pateras v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 37 Ohio App. 383,
174 N.E. 620 (1929).
Before the court can apply either theory it must be established as a
fact that the agent received notice or knowledge regarding something
within the scope of his authority, Cleveland v. Payne, 72 Ohio St. 347,
74 N.E. 177, 70 L.R.A. 841 (905), or that such agent had control
of the place or instrumentality. 26 Ohio Jur., p. 65 1, sec. 633; Ashta-
bula Rapid Transit Co. v. Stephenson, I2 Ohio C.D. 631, aff'd without
opinion in 67 Ohio St. 512, 67 N.E. 1oo (I9OI).
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Unless the notice is so given, the one giving it is not doing the
required act, which is to direct the information to one who is employed
to receive and act upon that particular knowledge. No duty of com-
munication would rest upon an agent where, from the nature of the
acts to be performed by him, the knowledge or notice would appear to
have no relation to or connection with those acts. Trentor v. Pothen,
46 Minn. 298, 49 N.V. 129, 24 Am. St. Rep. 225 (891); Cleve-
land v. Payne, supra; Lane v. United Electric Light & Water Co.,
88 Conn. 670, 92 Atl. 430 (1914); Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co.
v. Foley, 195 Ala. 391, 70 So. 726 (1916); Meyers v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra; Neff v. Redmond, 54 Cal. App. 757, 202
Pac. 925 (1921); Marsh v. Wheeler 77 Conn. 449, 59 Ad. 40,
107 Am. St. Rep. 40 (1904); Taylor v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 2 Ir. R.
i, Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 807 (913); King v. Roberts, i2o Mo. App.
i2o, 96 S-AV. 493 (1906).
The opinion stated, in the principal case, that the evidence was
undisputed that the agent alleged to have been notified of the defect in
the steps was employed only to clean halls and stairways, not to do
repairs. This is borne out, as to the extent of a janitor's duties, in a recent
Missouri decision where the court stated in a dictum that the janitor
had only to clean, not repair. But the court further stated that he
would be under a duty to report a state of disrepair if he found such, or
if others complained of such. Lambert v. Jones et al, 98 S.W. (2d)
752 (Mo., 1936). A recognition of this view in the principal case
would have enabled the plaintiff to impute to the defendant such knowl-
edge as she could establish in the janitor.
While, as before stated, the courts unqualifiedly lay down the gen-
eral rule that knowledge must be acquired within the scope of an agent's
employment before it can be imputed to his principal, it is pointed out in
a note in 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 444, [case note on Foreman v. German
Alliance Ins Co., 104 Va. 694, 52 S.E. 337, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 444
(905)], that the preponderance of modern authority is in favor of
holding the principal bound even when the agent acquires knowledge
outside the scope of his employment or agency, provided the facts are
yet present in his mind or memory. See, Hall & Brown Woodworking
Machine Co. v. Halley Furniture & Mfg. Co., 174 Ala. 190, 56 So.
726, L.R.A. i918 B 924 (1911); Borland v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal.
89, 33 Pac. 737, 37 Am. St. Rep. 32 (1893); Booker v. Booker,
supra; Wilson v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 26 Minn.
I12, 30 N.W. 401 (1886). If this view were followed in the principal
case, the plaintiff might recover on imputed knowledge even though
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the court refused to follow Lambert v. Jones, supra, and if it were
established that the janitor did in fact have notice.
The writer of the opinion of the principal case makes reference to
the fact that the janitor's loyalty might prompt him to give notice of
the defect, but he does not suggest any duty to do so. If, however, it
was his duty to communicate such knowledge, the law would either
"conclusively presume" the agent to have told his principal of the defect,
or, under the "alter ego" theory, the court could hold that knowledge
of the agent was knowledge of the principal, and the question of loyalty
would not be material; for, in either event, the defendant would then
be under a duty to repair. When an agent fails to communicate knowl-
edge acquired by him within the scope of his employment, it is a breach
of his duty to his principal; yet the notice has the same effect as to third
persons as though his duty had been faithfully performed. Cox v.
Pearce, 112 N.Y. 637, 20 N.E. 566, 3 L.R.A. 563 (889). "The
principal is affected by the knowledge which an agent had a duty to
disclose." Restatement of the Law of Igency, sec. 275, p. 6i .
In the principal case it was established that the defendant had placed
Zinn & Co. in entire management and control of the building in which
the plaintiff's injuries were received. Zinn & Co. had placed one Gugle
in active management and in charge of all repair work. The latter
testified to having no knowledge or notice of the defects. Other em-
ployees were Jackson, the head-janitor, and Porter, the elevator man
and assistant janitor.
On the hypothesis that Zinn & Co. was a primary agent, the defend-
ant retaining the right to control the manner in which the work is to be
done, the defendant's liability, if notice is necessary, would ultimately
turn on the question whether notice to a remote sub-agent, the janitor,
is imputable to his principal. Where the employment of an agent is such
as to necessarily imply that a sub-agent is to be employed, the principal
is bound by any knowledge acquired by the sub-agent, within the scope
of his authority, as in the case of any other agent. Patterson v. Keys &
Co., 13 Dec. Rep. 436, i C.S.C.R. 94 (1870); Schloss Bros. & Co. v.
Gibson Dry Goods Co., 6 Ala. App. 155, 6o So. 436 (1912); Merritt
v. Huber, 137 Iowa 135, 114 N.W. 627 (i9o8).
But if the sub-agent is merely the agent of the agent, the necessary
privity does not exist between such sub-agent and the principal, and the
knowledge of the sub-agent can not be imputed to the principal. Hoover
v. Wise, 91 U.s. 308, 23 L. Ed. 392 (1875); Boyd v. Vanderhemp,
I Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 273 (1846); Waldman v. North British Ins. Co.,
91 Ala. 170, 24 Am. St. Rep. 883, 8 So. 666 (i89o).
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In the principal case the judgment was reversed and remanded on
the weight of the evidence because of the ambiguity in the testimony of
the plaintiff's key witness. In the event of the introduction of substantial
evidence upon a new trial, it would seem necessary for the plaintiff, in
order to charge the defendant with notice of an alleged defective condi-
tion, to establish that Zinn & Co. was an agent, with authority by reason
of being such, by contract or custom, to appoint the sub-agent, who sub-
sequently employed other sub-agents, of notice within the scope of his
employment.
MARGARETTA BEYNON
TEST FOR ESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIP
While riding in a bus the plaintiff was injured in a head-on collision
with a taxi cab owned by defendant cab company. The driver of the
cab obtained the cab from the defendant by paying a deposit of $4.25
each morning, receiving the cab to use for the day as he saw fit. The
defendant also maintained call stations where the cab drivers might
receive calls by waiting their turn in line. The court dismissed the peti-
tion, holding that in the absence of evidence indicating that the defendant
had any right to exercise any acts of control over the acts of the cab
driver after the cab was turned over to him in the morning, there was
no agency existing between the driver and the owner of the cab so as to
make the owner liable for the negligence of the driver. Hudson v. Ohio
Bus Line Co. and Parkway Cabs, Inc., 23 Ohio Abs. 634, 8 Ohio O.P.
312 (1937).
It may be stated as a general proposition that when the employer has
the right to control the employee in the performance of his work the
latter is a servant, as distinguished from an independent contractor.
Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. I77, I65 N.E. 721 (1929); Kar v. The
Erie Rd. Co., I18 Ohio St. 612, 162 N.E. 793 (1928); Kruse v.
Revelson, I15 Ohio St. 594, 155 N.E. 137 (1927); Gechei v. Boltz,
13 Ohio App. ISo, 31 Ohio C.A. 5o6 (1920); Collier and Sons
Distr. Corp. v. Drinkwater, Si Fed. (2d) 200 (1936); Bohanon v.
James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. (2d) 188, 6o Pac. (2d)
510 (1936); Keeling v. Nall, 261 Ky. 232, 87 S.W. (2d) 370
(1935); Annotations, 75 A.L.R. 725 (1931); 19 A.L.R. 226, sub-
section 6 (1922); 14 R.C.L. 67 (1916). Many decisions require
control as tQ the "manner and means" of doing the work, or control
as to the "means of accomplishing the result," or control as to the
"details" of the work. Klar v. The Erie Rd. supra; Spears Dairy, Inc.
